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Opinion
Open access under CC BY license.It was suggested over 20 years ago that the supple-
mentarymotor cortex is involved in self-generated beha-
viour. Since then, there have been many studies using
electrophysiology and brain imaging of the role of the
supplementary motor cortex and anterior cingulate
cortex. In light of the findings, the proposal that these
regions are crucial for self-generated action has recently
been challenged. Here, we review the recent literature
and argue that the proposal survives the findings. We
further argue that it can be generalised to cover reflec-
tion on mental states. Finally, we suggest that the
pattern of anatomical connections is consistent with
the proposal that the medial frontal cortex is crucially
involved in self-generated action and self-reflection.
Self-generated action
The psychologist B.F. Skinner was the first to distinguish
between respondent and operant behaviour. In the former,
the animal responds to an external stimulus, such as a
light. In the latter, the animal operates on the environment
and is or is not rewarded. For example, food is presented to
a dog and it comes up and eats it (respondent behaviour).
Alternately, the dog comes up of its own accord and is given
a scratch on the back (operant behaviour). In one case,
there is a change in the environment and, in the other, the
initial change is in the dog.
Spontaneous actions such as this are ‘self-initiated’ or
‘self-generated’. These terms are used loosely here to in-
clude decisions both as to when to act and as to which
action to make when there are no external cues to specify
the appropriate action [1]. In an early study, Romo and
Schultz [2] compared self-initiated and externally trig-
gered movements, and reported that, on average, cells in
both the supplementary motor cortex (SMA) and lateral
pre-motor cortex fired earlier on self-initiated movements.
Okano and Tanji [3] confirmed the fact that such cells could
be found in both areas. However, the authors reported that
more cells in the SMA (89%) than in the pre-motor cortex
(39%) fired mainly or exclusively in the self-initiated task.
In the same task,50% of the cells in the SMA fired well in
advance of movement compared with only 12% of the cells
in the pre-motor cortex. The pattern in the anterior cingu-
late sulcus is similar to that in the SMA [4].Corresponding author: Passingham, R.E. (dick.passingham@psy.ox.ac.uk).
16 1364-6613 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reservIf this activity is essential for self-initiated movements,
interfering with it should reduce or abolish such move-
ments. Thus, monkeys whose pre-SMA and SMA were
removed bilaterally, made few self-initiated movements
[5]. Notably, the animals were tested in the dark and,
hence, there were no visual cues. Lesions to the same
regions did not affect externally triggered movement:
animals initiated movements relatively normally when
they were required to respond to a tone [5]. In the same
study, lesions of the cingulate motor areas [6] in the
cingulate sulcus also led to a drastic reduction of self-
initiated movements [5].
These effects were selective for the medial frontal cor-
tex: lesions of the lateral pre-motor cortex had little effect
on the number of self-initiated movements [7], although
the movements were less accurate (reflecting perhaps a
kinematic impairment) [8]. The same dissociation was
shown for sequences of movement when there were no
external cues to specify the order of the moves. Halsband
and Passingham [9,10] found that monkeys with lesions of
the SMA and pre-SMA failed to learn a new sequence of
three movements (pull, turn and lift) from memory. By
contrast, animals with lateral pre-motor lesions could
learn the task without difficulty.
These and other experiments led us to conclude that the
SMA and pre-SMA are particularly involved in self-gener-
ated movements [10]. This proposal was first made by
Eccles [11], and developed by Goldberg [12,13] on the basis
of the effects of lesions in patients. However, this proposal
has recently been challenged in a commentary by Nachev
et al. [14]. Several more recent studies using electrophysi-
ology and brain imaging have addressed the role of the
SMA and anterior cingulate cortex. Here, we review this
literature and argue that the proposal survives the find-
ings and can be generalised to cover reflection on mental
states. We also argue that the evidence for anatomical
connections is consistent with the proposal.
Potential challenges
It is first necessary to clarify the proposal. The issue is not
whether there are external cues that might trigger a move-
ment, but whether these uniquely specify the response. For
example, in one study by Mushiake et al. [15] on internally
and externally generated sequences of movement, there
were keys for the monkeys to respond to. However, in theed. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.11.001 Available online 5 December 2009
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not specify the order in which themonkeys should respond.
In the externally specified condition, each key lit up in
turn. The finding was that significantly more cells in the
SMA were active in the memory than in the visually
specified condition, and significantly more cells in the
pre-motor cortex in the visually specified than in the
memory condition. Similarly in the experiments using
sequences by Nakamura et al. [16], there were boxes for
themonkeys to respond to, but the boxes did not specify the
order in which the animal should touch them. There were
cells in the pre-SMA that changed their activity during the
learning of such sequences.
Given this proviso, the proposal can still be challenged.
In the study byMushiake et al. [15], therewere cells in both
the SMA and pre-motor cortex that fired in both the
memory and visually specified conditions. It would be
unreasonable to dismiss these cells as being of no func-
tional importance. Indeed, patients with medial lesions
that include the SMA show an increase in simple reaction
times to a light, perhaps as the result of a lack of prep-
aration for the stimulus [17]. However, monkeys with
lesions in the SMA and pre-SMA do not make any more
errors than normal on a visual conditional motor task in
which colour cues specify which action should be performed
[7]. This is in contrast to the severe impairment inmonkeys
with pre-motor lesions [7].
Furthermore, if the SMA or pre-SMA are inactivated
with muscimol, there is no effect on sequences that are
specified by visual cues, but a severe effect on sequences
that are performed from memory [18]. It is possible to
reconcile the electrophysiological and lesion findings if it
is supposed that the cells in the pre-motor cortex that fire
on memory-guided sequences derive their input from the
SMA via interconnections between the two areas [19]. If
the pre-SMA and SMA are inactivated, this would abolish
such activity in the pre-motor cortex and, thus, this area
could not ‘take over’. This hypothesis could be tested by
recording in the pre-motor cortex in monkeys with a lesion
in the pre-SMA and SMA.
Imaging experiments also show that there is activation
in the SMA and pre-SMA, as well as in the cingulate motor
areas, during externally triggered movements. In other
words, activation of these areas is not confined to self-
initiated movements [20,21]. However, it can be shown
with time-resolved fMRI that the activation in the pre-
SMA and SMA starts earlier when the movements are self-
initiated rather than externally triggered [21], and that
this is also earlier than in the motor cortex [22]. In other
words, activity in the SMA and pre-SMA reflects prep-
aration for the actions.
These experiments made no distinction between the
pre-SMA and/or SMA and the cingulate motor areas in
the anterior cingulate sulcus. That there is a distinction
was shown by Lau et al. [23], who used the Libet task [24],
and required subjects either to judge the time at which
they acted or the time at which they were first aware of
their intention to act. There was an enhancement in a
cingulate motor area when subjects attended to their
movements, and an enhancement in the pre-SMA when
they attended to their intention [25]. These results areconsistent with the proposal that the pre-SMA and/or SMA
and cingulate motor areas are involved together in self-
generated action.
In this experiment, the actions were spontaneous in
both conditions. However, the usual comparison is between
actions that are performed with or without external cues.
The problem is that there are four possible experimental
confounds in this comparison:
(i) In a self-generated task, human subjects are
instructed to initiate or choose between actions in
the scanner, and the implication is that they do so
randomly. This means that the activations might
reflect working memory, as subjects review their last
moves. This is indeed a problem in interpreting the
results of imaging studies of the role of the prefrontal
cortex in generating actions [1]. However, in the
experiments by Thaler et al. [5] on self-initiated action
inmonkeys, there was no such constraint on the times
at which the animals acted.(ii) Responding to an external cue can become routine
whereas deciding for oneself is not [14]. This is also a
problem in interpreting the results of imaging studies
on prefrontal cortex. This was shown by Lau et al.
[26], who found no difference in activation in the
prefrontal cortex for self-generated and externally
specified actions if the latter were non-routine.
However, in the same experiment, there was differ-
ential activation in the pre-SMA for the self-
generated task, even though the externally specified
task was also attentionally demanding.(iii) It could be argued that the fact that there can be
several possible actions in a self-generated task
implies that there is a conflict between the actions.
Botvinick et al. [27] have suggested that, in self-
generated tasks, the responses are ‘underdetermined’
and that the activation of medial frontal cortex could
be explained as reflecting the monitoring of conflict.
Thus, there is activation in the anterior cingulate
cortex in conflict trials on the Eriksen flanker task. In
these trials, conflict is deliberately introduced by
arranging for the peripheral stimuli to specify a
response that is different from the one that is
specified by the central stimulus.
Lau et al. [28] therefore compared activation on a self-
generation task with activation on the Eriksen
flanker task. The differential activations lay in the
pre-SMA for generation and the anterior cingulate
convexity cortex for the flanker task. Nachev et al. [29]
required subjects to make a saccade to the left or right
and introduced conflict by using a cue that specified a
change in plan. The peak was in the part of the
supplementary eye field as defined by the activation
for antisaccades, anterior to the part that is activated
for saccades [30]. Although the task involved inhi-
bition, it differed from the Eriksen flanker task in that
there were no conflicting visual cues.(iv) Nachev et al. [14] have suggested that the conditions
for action are more complex for self-initiated than for
externally-specified actions. We agree that talking
about actions as being generated by ‘inner cues’ is
vague, because the cues are not specified. We also17
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18agree with the fact that there are various conditions
for action, and that it is necessary to spell them out in
detail. We therefore do so in the next section.Conditions for action
Some of the conditions for self-generated action include:
(i) Actions can be specified by the time interval that has
elapsed, as in the Libet task [24], and there are cells in
thepre-SMAandSMAthat code for time intervals [31].(ii) One action can serve as a cue for the next action as in
generating a series of actions on the ‘free selection’
task [1], and there are cells in the pre-SMA and SMA
that code for specific transitions [32].(iii) The representation of the goal (or potential outcome)
can serve to retrieve the action that is appropriate in
achieving that goal, as in the arm raise task [5].(iv) A change in the goal can serve to retrieve a change in
the action. For example, if one type of food is devalued
by feeding the animal on it to satiation, the animal
shifts to the action that is appropriate for obtaining
the other food [33]. In rats, lesions of the medial
frontal cortex disrupt this effect [34]. In monkeys,
lesions in the anterior cingulate cortex impair the
ability of the animals to choose the action that is
appropriate for the type of food reward that is
presented [35].(v) Failure to obtain the expected goal or reward can cue
a change in the appropriate action, as in the motor
reversal task introduced by Chen et al. [36]. Monkeys
with lesions in the SMA and pre-SMA were slow to
reverse [36], as were monkeys with lesions in the
anterior cingulate sulcus and convexity cortex [37],
but not monkeys with pre-motor lesions [7].Evaluation of outcomes
If there are no external cues to specify the appropriate
action, the animal must base its decision on an evaluation
of the potential outcomes. It is a crucial finding that there
are many cells in the anterior cingulate sulcus that encode
the value of goals in terms of their probability, payoff and
cost [38]. Indeed, there are more such cells in that area
than in the orbital frontal cortex. Both the anterior cingu-
late cortex and orbital frontal cortex are involved in associ-
ations with outcomes, but both lesion [39,40] and imaging
evidence [41] implicate the orbital frontal cortex in learned
associations between stimuli and outcomes and the
anterior cingulate cortex in learned associations between
actions and outcomes.
The anterior cingulate cortex is involved in switching
between actions only where there is no external cue to
specify a switch. Thus, there are cells in the anterior
cingulate sulcus in monkeys [42] and humans [43] that
fire when an action is not followed by the expected reward,
so that an alternative actionmust be performed on the next
trial. But these cells do not fire or fire less if there is an
external cue to specify the shift. After a surgical excision in
the anterior cingulate cortex, human subjects were slow to
switch after a reduction in the expected reward.
Given these findings, it is not surprising that there is
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex when human sub-
jects do not obtain the expected outcome, as when theymake errors [44]. Rushworth et al. [45] interpret these
results in terms of the evaluation of outcomes, whether
positive or negative [46]. An alternative proposal is that
the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in the monitoring
of conflict, but Botvinick et al. [47] accept that this might be
subsumed under the more general description of the evalu-
ation of outcomes.
Rushworth et al. [48] go on to relate the functions of the
anterior cingulate cortex and pre-SMA and/or SMA by
suggesting that the pre-SMA and SMA are involved in
‘voluntary’ or self-generated action, and the anterior cin-
gulate cortex in the evaluation of outcomes. If so, it is clear
how a change in that evaluation, as in the devaluation
paradigm, could lead to a change in action.
Reflecting on one’s own performance
The activations that relate to value when human subjects
learn motor rather than stimulus reversals lie in the mid-
cingulate cortex (area 24) and the pre-SMA [41]. In the
human brain, cingulate area 24 lies posterior and inferior
to the paracingulate cortex area 32. Although a ventral
area 32 can be identified in the monkey brain, there does
not seem to be any homologue of the human dorsal para-
cingulate cortex [49].
There is evidence that, in the human brain, this area is
also involved in the monitoring of outcomes. Bengtsson
et al. [50] gave subjects the n-back memory task, having
told one group that this was a test of intelligence and the
other group that the task was being piloted so as to find the
optimal parameters. In fact, the task parameters were
designed so as to ensure that performance was equated
between the two groups. In both groups, as expected, there
was activation in themid-cingulate cortex when theymade
errors. However, in the group that took the task to be a
challenge to their intelligence, there was also activation in
the dorsal paracingulate cortex on error trials.
The paracingulate activation was interpreted as relat-
ing to reflection on one’s own performance. It was notable
that the peak of the enhanced activation lay in the same
area as the peak when these subjects were specifically
required to rate their own performance [50]. The compari-
son group rated the task parameters. It was argued that
errors were of more significance for the group who took the
memory test to be a test of intelligence. Whereas monkeys
can monitor outcomes, it is unlikely that they can relate
them in this way to a self-image.
There is, of course, no way of askingmonkeys to describe
themselves, but humans can be asked. It is known that,
when subjects rate whether particular trait words do or do
not apply to themselves, the peak of activation lies in the
dorsal paracingulate cortex in a similar location [51]. The
suggestion is that in reflecting on their general character-
istics, human subjects evaluate their own actions. For
example, ‘I can decide whether I am ‘kind’ by reflecting
on the actions that I have performed in the past and on my
future intentions’.
As already mentioned, when subjects attend to their
actions [23] or intentions [25], the activations are in the
medial frontal cortex. Furthermore, amultivariate analysis
has been used to show that one can read the content of
intentions from preparatory activity in the paracingulate
Figure 1. Anatomical connections of the lateral and medial frontal cortex. For
references see section on ‘Anatomical Connections’.
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Frith [53], the reason why the paracingulate cortex is also
activated when subjects reflect on the mental states of
others might be that it is also involved in reflecting on one’s
own mental states. Twometa-analyses [54,55] suggest that
there is a posterior to anterior organization on the medial
frontal surface, with themore anterior paracingulate cortex
being involved in metacognition, as in reflecting on mental
states.
Extension to other findings
There is a danger that, in propounding an argument, one
cherry picks the data that fit, while ignoring other data. It
is for this reason that meta-analyses are useful. Paus and
Koski [56,57] have carried out two meta-analyses of acti-
vations in the medial frontal cortex, and it is clear that
regionswithin themedial frontal cortex can be activated on
a variety of tasks. There are two findings in particular that
need to be addressed.
The first relates to retrieval from episodic memory.
When subjects are required to retrieve memories of actions
as opposed to objects, there are activations in the para-
cingulate as well as the anterior and posterior cingulate
cortex. The activations are in the medial frontal cortex
when recall of action is contrastedwith recall of objects, but
on the lateral surface when subjects retrieve memories
concerning objects rather than actions [58,59]. In everyday
life, these memories might occur spontaneously, although
in these experiments they were cued by a brief verbal
description. However, the subjects then had to close their
eyes for 20 seconds, during which they had recall and re-
experience the event [59]. In other words, they generated
the details. We suggest that activations on the medial
frontal surface reflect memory of action sequences, where
one action serves as the cue for the next action.
The second finding is that, when subjects are at rest as
opposed to carrying out a cognitive task, there is more
activity in the medial frontal cortex, which forms part of
the ‘default system’ [60,61]. It has been suggested that
activity in the medial frontal cortex reflects ‘self-referen-
tial’ processes [62] or ‘mind wandering’ [63]. There are two
potential problems with this interpretation. First, the
authors simply inferred that the subjects were engaged
in spontaneous thoughts. However, in a study by McGuire
et al. [64], the subjects rated how frequently ‘stimulus-
independent thoughts’ occurred, and the activation in the
medial frontal cortex was greater the greater the number
of such thoughts. The second problem is that, as Gilbert
et al. [65] point out, spontaneous thoughts could concern
the sounds or vibration of the scanner or other aspects of
the scanner environment. However, the crucial issue for
the present argument is whether these cues uniquely
specified the contents of the thoughts. To use an analogy,
sentence completion involves cued recall, but in con-
strained cases, there can be only one word that is suitable
whereas in unconstrained cases there might be many; in
such cases, the subjects will need to generate possible
words themselves [66]. Similarly, an external stimulus,
such as a noise, can cue a specific thought (‘there is a loud
noise’) as opposed to unconstrained thoughts (such as
‘perhaps the machine is malfunctioning’).Anatomical connections
It remains to be shown why it is that self-generated
behaviour and monitoring of one’s own performance
depend on mechanisms on the medial frontal surface.
Passingham et al. [67] have argued that the key to un-
derstanding the function of any particular brain area lies
in establishing its ‘connectional fingerprint’; that is, the
way in which the pattern of connections differs from that of
other areas.
Figure 1 compares the connections of the medial and
lateral surface of the macaque brain. It is notable that
there is only one sensory association area that sends a
direct connection to the medial frontal cortex, and this is
the superior temporal auditory cortex [68]. It could be that
this auditory input accounts for the fact that there is a
cingulate motor area in the monkey brain that is involved
in spontaneous vocalization [69,70]. Otherwise, the medial
frontal cortex receives no direct projections from other
sensory association areas [71]. These instead go to the
lateral and orbital prefrontal cortex. Whereas the parietal
cortex receives information from three senses, the lateral
and orbital frontal cortex receives information from all five
external senses [72]. The dorsal pre-motor cortex receives
visuo-spatial information from the prefrontal cortex [73],
whereas the ventral pre-motor cortex receives visual infor-
mation from the anterior intra-parietal cortex [74].
Whereas the medial frontal cortex receives little direct
information about the external world, it has a heavy
proprioceptive input from area 3a [75]. At the same time,
it is well informed about the internal environment as the
result of limbic inputs [76] and, in particular, it is closely
interconnected with the amygdala [77,78]. Finally, there
are interconnections between the medial motor areas, the
cingulate areas processing reward and the cingulate areas
that are involved in retrieval from memory [68].19
Box 1. Questions for future research
 Does the degree to which external cues do or do not fully specify
the action relate to the degree of activation in the medial frontal
cortex?
 Is the activation of medial frontal cortex during episodic recall
restricted to the recall of sequences of action and, if so, does it
matter whether recall is prompted by external cues?
 Does activation in the ‘default system’ relate to the spontaneous
generation of thoughts, irrespective of whether they are about the
external environment or about the self?
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The connections specified above suggest that information
about the external world is initially processed on the
lateral surface; they are also consistent with the proposal
that the integration of information about the actions and
internal state of the animal involves structures on the
medial frontal surface. However, it is important to be clear
about what we are and are not claiming.
First, we are not claiming that information about the
self is only processed on the medial surface. We know, for
example, that the parietal cortex also receives a proprio-
ceptive input from area 3a [79], and the orbital frontal
cortex receives information about the viscera [76]. Our
claim only concerns the association of goals with actions
and of actions with outcomes.
Second, we are not claiming that, at any one time, one
system operates in the brain and that the other does not.
We know, for example, that the SMA and the lateral pre-
motor cortex are closely interconnected [19], and that cells
fire simultaneously in the two areas [2]. This is what would
be expected given that the distinction between self-gener-
ated and externally guided actions is rarely absolute, but
often one of degree. Consider, for example, the verb gener-
ation task on which subjects generate verbs from nouns.
Here, the noun acts as a prompt but it does not completely
specify a particular verb. Instead, the subject has a set of
verbs to choose from, and the noun acts to restrict the range
of verbs that would be appropriate. When subjects perform
this task there is activation both in the lateral prefrontal
cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex [80]. Although
lesions can dissociate systems artificially, in real life the
brain works as a whole. Our proposals are only of any value
if they suggest further questions for research. The most
crucial ones are outlined in Box 1.
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